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We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (A Council on Foreign Relations book) | 
 enlarge | Author: John Lewis Gaddis
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Category: Book
List Price: $24.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  22 reviews
Sales Rank: 110151
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 448
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.2
Dimensions (in): 9 x 6.4 x 1.1
ISBN: 0198780710
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.7301717
EAN: 9780198780717
ASIN: 0198780710
Publication Date: July 9, 1998
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Amazon.com Review
Was the Cold War inevitable? Was there an international communist conspiracy? Did Castro and Khrushchev beat Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis? After combing through a mass of declassified and previously unavailable documentation to reconsider the collision of the American and Soviet empires, Yale professor Gaddis replies in the affirmative. Given Josef Stalin's convictions, the Cold War was inescapable: it is the choices that each side made that prove fruitful for historical research, and not the mere fact of the war, as Gaddis neatly demonstrates. The American empire--Gaddis's term--prevailed because, he says, "democracy proved superior to autocracy in maintaining coalitions," and not necessarily because of any technological or economic advantage. Gaddis dispels several misconceptions and urges that students of Cold War history should foremost "retain the capacity to be surprised."
Product Description
Based on the latest findings of Cold War historians and extensive research in American archives as well as the recently opened archives in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China, this book provides a vividly written, eye-opening account of the Cold War during the years from the end of World War II to its most dangerous moment, the Cuban missile crisis.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 17 more reviews...
 As another reviewer noted, should have been titled "What I Now Think" December 1, 2008
This is a loathesome book. It exhibits all the worst characteristics of the triumphalist school of Cold War studies: apologetics for imperialism dressed up as moral seriousness, smug superiority, and a massive scholarly apparatus (unnecessary, since the book's argument is no different from a Ronald Reagan speech) to intimidate those grad students who would dare disagree. My favorite part of the book was where Gaddis declared his intention to "take ideology seriously," or examine the way the different ideologies of the US and the USSR impacted their foreign relations. An interesting idea, but Gaddis in fact does nothing of the sort. The entire depth of his "ideological analysis" is the contention that the Americans loved freedom, while the Soviets were authoritarian. This is not ideology analysis: it is plain ideology, and more than that, it is a piss poor explanation for the actions of either the soviet or the American state. Gaddis also argues, in reference to Stalin, that "authoritarianism breeds romanticism." One wonders, however, if he realized the extent to which his little aphorism applied to himself. For Gaddis rigorously excludes the entire revisionist school of cold war studies from his bibliography, a maneuver necessary for his ridiculously romantic view of American foreign policy.
 Provoking the Bear.... August 12, 2007
4 out of 7 found this review helpful
It's almost impossible to defend dictators who always overstay their historical need, however, we tend to leave out some of the historical facts that may be a part of the problem.
We (USA) sent 15,000 troops into Russia in 1918 to fight the bolsheviks. In addition, Harry Truman authorized overflights of Russia in 1950 using the new Boeing B-47 as a reconnaissance platform. Some histories point out that up to 200 military personnel were lost in these overflights.
I would say that this kind of activity is 'somewhat' provocative and might cause the Russians some concern, particularly in regard to our (USA's) motives AND intentions.
We (the USA) then added the U-2 spy plane into the mix in 1956 and we denied sending this plane over Russian territory. Until, of course, the loss of a U-2 in 1960.
So the Russian Bear really had a dance partner and if the dance partner didn't create the problem, it certainly didn't help to solve the problem and this added to Russia's paranoia!!!!!
JL GADDIS is a house toady. And he teaches at the school that has a long tradition of providing candidates to the Central Intelligence Agency, whose reputation is overstated and whose greatest claim to fame is taking on and SOMETIMES defeating 3rd world countries and governments.
a bit lazy January 24, 2007
3 out of 10 found this review helpful
Not much new in this recycled history of the Cold War. Presents the story from the exclusive standpoint of American policy makers.
 Rethinking the First Years of the Cold War November 20, 2006
6 out of 6 found this review helpful
"We Now Know" is Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis' review of the early years of the post-World War II competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. This book was first published in 1997, a few years after the Soviet side of the Cold War had become available to historians in the West. Gaddis and others had previously written from what was known about the West and surmised about the Communists. Gaddis revisits the struggle and fleshes out how actions on both sides drove the course of history.
This is a scholarly volume, written for the graduate student in foreign affairs, with large numbers of footnotes. Nevertheless, the general reader with an interest in the Cold War and the fortitude to persevere through some long stretches of dry material will be richly rewarded with some interesting insights.
Gaddis finds that the personalities of principal communist leaders such as Stalin, Khrushchev, and Mao played a disportionate role in determining the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and Communist China, the direct result of a lack of checks and balances in their authoritarian governments. Stalin's paranoid need for security inside and outside Russia, for example, was so great in 1945 that no concessions by the West could have avoided the Cold War. Khrushchev's attempt to bluff the West on the size of the Soviet strategic deterrent also fooled his allies, contributing to misunderstandings and failed policy. Gaddis assesses that Kim Il-Song of North Korea misled both Stalin and Mao into supporting his invasion of South Korea in 1950.
Gaddis finds that the policy of both the United States and the Soviet Union were to a significant degree shaped by interaction with their respective allies. The willingness of the United States to consult in a meaningful way with its allies was essential to the acceptance of its policies, while the tendency of the Soviet Union to coerce its allies triggered much of the resistance that undermined the Soviet empire. Gaddis' thoughtful analysis of the role of nuclear weapons is especially worthwhile.
"We Now Know" holds up remarkably well against the ten years of additional research available since Gaddis wrote this book. It is highly recommended to students of the Cold War.
 Rehashed previous material mostly... November 13, 2006
4 out of 8 found this review helpful
Gaddis rehashed much of his previously printed material mostly, and consults very little foregin source material, and of course again lays the blame for the Cold War at Stalin's feet. Though this work may provide a decent primer for those beginning to study the Cold War, this work is not going to provide a very fresh look or say much Gaddis hasn't said before... To counter balance Gaddis, take a look at "Cold War Triumphalism" edited by Ellen Schrecker.
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